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ESSAYS
AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA?
Alfred P. Rubint
Early drafts of what became the Statute of the Interna-
tional Tribunal for the prosecution of persons responsible for se-
rious violations of international humanitarian law committed in
the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1 January 1991,
contained many problems of concept and of detail. There are
many scholars whose intellectual model of the international
legal order leads them to consider atrocities committed in
armed conflict as offenses under conventional international hu-
manitarian law, a body of law which they consider beyond any
doubt to be part of international customary law. They also be-
lieve that there is a recognized principle of international law
which provides that certain offenses may be punished by any
state even where none of the common bases of jurisdiction ex-
ists. In my opinion, this "monist" model of the international
legal order is inconsistent with 350 years of experience under
the unwritten Westphalian Constitution,1 violates Occam's Ra-
zor, and is unworkable today. Fortunately, in my view, the Re-
port of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and its
annexed Statute take a "dualist" stance by which municipal
legal orders are considered distinct from the international legal
t Distinguished Professor of International Law, The Fletcher School of Law
& Diplomacy, Tufts University.
I An outline of this model of the overall international order is given in Alfred
P. Rubin, Enforcement Rules of International Law, 34 HAnv. INTL L.J. 149, 159-
160 (1993).
1
PACE INT'L L. REV.
order.2 The Report and its annexed Statute try to be careful in
their language, avoiding unnecessary jurisprudential generali-
ties. They have not been wholly successful. Nonetheless, the
Statute was adopted by the Security Council in its Resolution
827 on 25 May 1993.3 In its Resolution, the Security Council
purports to be acting under the authority of Chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter, taking enforcement action to restore
international peace and security.4 This source of authority
solves some legal problems and creates others. Let us turn first
to some overwhelming issues of fundamental principle in the
Report and in the Statute, then look at the implications of the
many traces of the original monist approach and its inconsisten-
cies. Next, let us look at signs of undue haste in the drafting of
the Report and the Statute which will inevitably serve as a pri-
mary source for questions of interpretation. Finally, let us ex-
amine some of the problems that can be expected to arise as a
result of that haste.
Let us turn first to the deeper conceptual problems: What is
the extent of the authority of the Security Council, even under
Chapter VII of the Charter, to erect an institution whose opera-
tion threatens the internal organization of a "belligerent" or the
actual operating government of a state? I.e., did states, when
adhering to the U.N. Charter, envisage themselves re-creating
the Holy Alliance, with the victors of World War II as the mod-
em equivalent of Platonic Guardians, and the humanitarian
laws of war as the set of substantive rules, adherence to which
determines who should rule the units that comprise the. inter-
national legal order?
The inconsistencies between the international legal order
as it appears to be under the Westphalian Constitution, and the
order as monist proponents of an International Tribunal would
like it to be by their special construction of the U.N. Charter
and the authority of the Security Council, appear most vividly
in two places.
2 U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/25704, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1163 sq. (Secretary
General's Report) and 1192 sq. (Statute of the International Tribunal) (1993)
(hereinafter "Report" and "Statute" respectively).
3 S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 3217th mtg., reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1203 (1993).
4 Id.
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The first major problem is the authority given the "Prosecu-
tor." Article 18 of the Statute establishes that it is the Prosecu-
tor who prepares indictments, 5 and under Article 19 a judge6 of
a Trial Chamber of the Tribunal reviews the indictment and
must confirm it if he/she is satisfied that a prima facie case ex-
ists. Apparently, there is no authority in any of these people to
exercise political discretion. Even high officials in the belliger-
ent forces or government of a party to the conflict do not have
authority to relieve any accused of criminal responsibility under
Article 7(2) of the Statute.7 Therefore, the Prosecutor, with the
approval of a non-political judge, not only has the authority, but
he/she has the responsibility to "decapitate" an army, a negoti-
ating team or a civil authority even before the offense is proved.
I cannot believe that any of the parties to the conflict in
former Yugoslavia will cooperate with this arrangement as it
might apply in the one case in which their cooperation would be
effective: To transfer to the International Tribunal persons
within their own power structure who are accused of offenses
within the purview of the Tribunal. The only effect that this
arrangement seems likely to have would involve captives or the
leaders of a defeated enemy. This should not be surprising,
given that the Nuremberg model was in fact a victors' tribunal.
A second major inconsistency between the Statute and the
Westphalian legal order lies in the roles states are to play in the
enforcement system envisaged by the Statute. It rests on the
obligations of states members of the U.N. to "accept and carry
out decisions of the Security Council in accordance with" Article
25 of the U.N. Charter and the categorization of Resolution 827
as authorized by Chapter VII of the Charter. Presumably the
reasons for acting under Chapter VII include not only the desire
to avoid questions about the reach of Article 25 to the jus in
bello instead of the normaljus ad bellum interpretation. There
also must or should have been an apprehension that the strug-
gle in former Yugoslavia, as an internal armed conflict, might
be beyond the reach of United Nations regulation. The struggle
in former Yugoslavia has, or at least had, been categorized by
5 Statute, art. 18, reprinted in 32 LL.M. at 1197 (1993).
6 The text says "the judge," but since there are three judges in each trial
chamber it is hard to say what was intended here.
7 Statute, art. 7(2), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1194 (1993).
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all the parties involved as an internal armed conflict. Under
Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations, except for the
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII noth-
ing in the Charter authorizes any organ of the United Nations
to "intervene in matters which are essentially within the do-
mestic jurisdiction of any state."8 Clearly, unless action by the
Security Council were categorized as "enforcement measures"
under Chapter VII, the organs of the U.N. would have exceeded
their authority under the Charter by exercising any purview
over the conflict except, perhaps, their power to "discuss" and to
pass non-binding resolutions by analogy to action taken with
regard to apartheid in South Africa.
But application of Security Council decisions under Article
25 does not solve the problem. First, there are theoretical
problems under Article 29 of the Statute.9 Only "States" are
bound to cooperate in such arrests and handings over. The Bos-
nian Serbs are not subject to the orders of the Tribunal. They
are not even subject to the "decision" of the Security Council in
this regard, since they are not a state (yet?). Thus the Bosnian
Serbs can be held bound to an Article 25 decision'0 of the Secur-
ity Council only by a logic that would hold all national libera-
tion movements equally bound or would insert jus ad bellum
criteria into the jus in bello against a hundred and thirty years
of experience. Holding the Bosnian Serbs bound by an Article
25 decision of the Security Council also seems to violate funda-
mental democratic governmental theory based on our own no-
tion of"no taxation without representation." The Bosnian Serbs
are not represented in the United Nations by the authorities of
Bosnia-Herzegovina against whom they are rebelling or, judg-
ing from their refusal to accept the "advice" of the leaders of
Serbia-Montenegro, by any other authority that is represented
in the U.N.
Second, there are practical realities that get in the way. If
the authorities representing Bosnia-Herzegovina could arrest
those Serbians or Croatians they believe to have been guilty of
the offenses listed in the Statute, they surely would. It is un-
likely that they can carry out an arrest order aimed at Serbians
8 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
9 Statute, art. 29, reprinted in 32 LL.M. at 1200 (1993).
10 U.N. CHARTER, art. 25.
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or Croatians issued by the Prosecutor. Is it expected that the
authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina would hand over people in
their own command structure who have been accused by the
Prosecutor of triable offenses to the Tribunal? Similarly, would
the authorities of Croatia or the armies of the Bosnian Serbs
hand over their own people for such trials to the Tribunal?
Ironically, the largest foreseeable scope of operation of that pro-
vision is likely to be to get accused Serbian or Croatian war
criminals out of the hands of Bosnian-Herzegovinian officials
who would plan to punish them anyhow, probably with harsher
penalties than the International Tribunal.
This raises a lesser question that also indicates some confu-
sion as to the legal model that lies behind the Statute of the
Tribunal: the location of the Tribunal. The Statute provides for
its seat to be at The Hague (Article 31), 11 although the Secre-
tary-General's Report also suggests the possibility of Geneva or
elsewhere. The firmest guidance is that it be located outside
former Yugoslavia. There seems to be a presumption that the
tribunal is "the world" bringing former Yugoslavia back to the
larger community. But that was not the perception at Nurem-
berg or Tokyo (or Manila - as in the Yamashita and Homma
trials), where the site of the trials was the place where the of-
fenses occurred. As far as I know, there were no offenses com-
mitted in The Hague or Geneva by any persons who are
potential defendants before this Tribunal. It is very hard for me
to understand how trials in places beyond the reach of local me-
dia in former Yugoslavia are supposed to help bring a desire for
order to that benighted area or sense of shame for atrocities
committed in the name of ethnic interest. Therefore, trials as
proposed now cannot accomplish the "civilizing mission" that
was an essential reason for Nuremberg and Tokyo. As to im-
pressing the Balkan populace with the notion that it is "the
world" or "the civilized world" that is running things, I doubt
very strongly that any former Yugoslavians will be convinced of
that if the tribunal's authority is restricted to events in former
Yugoslavia; if American leaders accused of ordering war crimes
or "grave breaches" during the Gulf War (Captain Rogers of the
Vincennes; General Schwarzkopf in connection with the bomb-
ing of what turned out to be a bomb shelter in Baghdad?) are
11 Statute, art. 31, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 1201 (1993).
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not subjected to the same procedures and same laws as accused
former Yugoslavs. It may seem obvious to us that "genocide" is
more evil than shooting down civilian airliners, but that percep-
tion is not universally shared. Indeed, in light of our anguish
over the supposed role of Libyan officials in the Lockerbie inci-
dent, there is a certain amount of hypocrisy that will be appar-
ent to everybody but us in this matter.
Finally in this discussion of conflicting principles in the
Statute of the new Tribunal as adopted by the Security Council,
I would mention one of a series of what seem confusions about
the international legal order in relatively minor specifics. Arti-
cle 10, "Non-bis-in-idem," identifies the "crimes" at municipal
law with the crimes under the "monist" law-of-war conceptions
currently popular with international lawyers, and concludes
that a trial under a municipal legal order and a trial by the In-
ternational Tribunal are really the submission of a single situa-
tion under a single legal order to two tribunals: double
jeopardy.12 That notion is abandoned (in my opinion, properly)
if the person who has been tried by a national court for acts
constituting serious violations of international humanitarian
law was tried for acts "characterized as an ordinary crime".' 3
But this dualist conclusion retains its monist bias in its elision:
"Characterized" by whom as an "ordinary crime"? Should the
judges in an international tribunal have the authority to deter-
mine definitively, as if "objectively," the legal category of a mu-
nicipal process? Does trial by a military court martial for
violation of military law self-evidently exclude categorization as
an "ordinary crime"? Lieutenant Calley? An off duty soldier
robbing a taxi driver, but tried by a military court? Should the
International Tribunal be able to characterize the proceedings
of a municipal legal order while purporting to interpret its own
authority under a "Statute" drafted by international civil ser-
vants and adopted by the Security Council of the United Na-
tions by states who do not expect their decisions to be applied to
themselves? We have had some experience with this sort of
thing, principally the United States extradition to Israel of Abu
Eain, a Palestinian who planted a bomb at a rock festival in
Galilee. The United States insisted that Israel try him under
12 Statute, art. 10, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 1195 (1993).
13 Statute, art. 10(2)(a), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 1195 (1993).
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"ordinary" criminal law instead of the laws of war; an insistence
with which Israel was delighted to concur, but which seriously
misread the actual situation of the time in Israel. But I have
written about that elsewhere and do not propose to repeat the
argument here.14
There are other problems with the Statute of the Tribunal
that might assume some significance. For example, why is the
date of 1 January 1991 asserted by the Secretary-General to be
a "neutral" date?15 I would want to know what was happening
in former Yugoslavia in 1989 and 1990 before I could agree to
that; not that "reprisal" will excuse violations of those parts of
the laws of war in place to protect persons hors de combat, but
that political or propaganda advantages might be given to one
side or the other by choosing a date that appears significant to
them for reasons not considered by us outsiders. Were there
any violations of the laws of war by either side before that date
which were then rectified afterwards? Are we depriving some
accused individuals of a locus poenitentiae that the date allows
to some on the other side?
There are many other traces of confusion in the Statute.
Perhaps some reflect disagreements as to the pertinent model of
the international legal order; I suspect most reflect advocates'
haste to move the world in their favorite direction before any-
body has a chance to think too hard about it. But since the Stat-
ute is to be the basis for defining and enforcing criminal law,
every elision or inconsistency risks major injustice to real peo-
ple. Let me list some of them.
Under Article 1 the International Tribunal has the power
to "prosecute persons responsible" for the listed atrocities.1 6
How does the Prosecutor or anybody else know who is "responsi-
ble" for an atrocity before the prosecution? Surely more careful
drafting would have used the phrase "prosecute persons alleged
to be [or 'believed to be'] responsible." The same problem exists
in Article 4.1.17
14 See, Extradition of Terrorists, Case Note on Eain.v. Wilkes, 15 INT'L PRAC.
NoTEBooK 10 (1981).
16 Statute, art. 8, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 1194 (1993).
16 Statute, art. 1, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 1192 (1993).
17 Article 4.1 gives the Tribunal power "to prosecute persons committing geno-
cide" as if only those caught inflagrante delicto. Statute, art. 4.1, reprinted in 32
I.L.M. at 1193 (1993).
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Article 2(d) defines some of the offenses: "extensive destruc-
tion... carried out unlawfully."' s But "unlawfully" by what
"law"? This language comes verbatim from the 1949 Geneva Ci-
vilians Conventions (Convention IV) Article 147,19 but that does
not make it appropriate for this purpose. The Convention gave
to states parties the responsibility to put meaning into these
general phrases. The states parties have not done so except in
their municipal criminal law, which is not binding on anybody
outside the jurisdiction of the enacting state. Indeed, I know of
no state that has actually referred to this phrase in its munici-
pal criminal or military law, and I know of no "handing over" of
persons alleged to have committed a "grave breach," so no diplo-
matic correspondence or practice puts meaning into
"unlawfully."
The same problem exists in Article 2(g): "unlawful deporta-
tion or transfer or unlawful confinement"20 by what "law"? And
does the use of the word "unlawful" before two nouns and not
the third mean that "lawful" transfers of protected persons are
criminally punishable?
Article 9 allows the Tribunal to "request" national courts to
defer to its competence. 21 But must the International Tribu-
nal's "request" that a national tribunal defer to its competence
be obeyed? Where does the Statute say so?
Article 10.2(b) lifts the ban on double trials if the national
court proceedings "were not impartial... or the case was not
diligently prosecuted."22 But who determines if there is a case
"not diligently prosecuted"? How? On what evidence? Does the
new Tribunal sit in judgment on the efficacy of municipal crimi-
nal process? The Prosecutor plus one judge?
Article 24.3 allows Trial Chambers of the International Tri-
bunal to order the return of "property acquired by criminal con-
duct."23 What is property "acquired by criminal conduct"? A
taking of property by military requisition without the receipt
18 Statute, art. 2(d), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 1192 (1993).
19 Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of
12 August 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 970-73.
20 Statute, art. 2(g), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 1192 (1993).
21 Statute, art. 9, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 1194 (1993).
22 Statute, art. 10(2)(b), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 1195 (1993).
23 Statute, art. 24(3), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 1199 (1993).
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that the Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention requires?2 4 A
taking by purported civil authority whose "right" to rule is con-
tested? But errors in handing out receipts can occur; are they in
the same category as "genocide" or "rape"? And all legal author-
ities that can, "expropriate" private property from time to time.
Does this provision belong here?
Article 29.2(b) requires states to comply with any request
for assistance or order issued by a Trial Chamber.25 As noted
above, it is not clear that this article applies to a "request" is-
sued by the Tribunal itself under Article 9.26 More seriously,
does the requirement for cooperation in the taking of testimony
and the production of evidence apply to the defendant, too? If
so, any defendant demanding evidence classified by himself
must be released, I suppose. Is that what is intended? Suppose
the defendant demands that the Chamber request what he or
she claims is exculpatory evidence classified by the United
States or United Kingdom or the Government of one of the Bal-
kan states other than his or her own? Would we in the United
States obey such an order for CIA evidence?
Many of these apparently minor problems seem to me to
trace to parts of the Secretary-General's Report.27 For example,
in paragraph 42 of that Report the Nuremberg tribunal's adop-
tion of the 1907 Hague rules28 as if general international law is
mentioned, but the Tokyo tribunal, which was later in time
than Nuremberg, took a softer line that is not mentioned.
There is no acknowledgment that the Nuremberg adoption is
not supported by consistent practice. Similarly, paragraph 4729
does not mention the fact that the definition of crimes against
humanity adopted for Nuremberg in the London Charter s° re-
stricted the definition to the then current war in order to avoid
charging the Soviets or the colonial powers (the United King-
dom and France) with the same crimes. But in Article 5 dealing
24 See, Hague Convention on Law and Customs of War on Land, Annex, Oct.
18, 1907, arts. 51 and 52, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539.
25 Statute, art. 29.2(b), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 1200 (1993).
26 See supra note 21.
27 See supra note 2.
28 See supra note 24.
29 Report, art. 4, para. 47, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 1173 (1993).
30 Convention on the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminal of
European Axis, Charter for an International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59
Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 280.
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with "crimes against humanity" the qualification is dropped.3 ' I
can understand why, and it might be good "progressive develop-
ment," but it is polemical and evasive to do that without expla-
nation or even mention of the revision made in the texts.
Paragraph 48 of the Secretary General's Report says that
in the conflict within former Yugoslavia there have been atroci-
ties and "such inhumane acts have taken the form of so-called
'ethnic cleansing'." 32 Can this assertion be made in a legal doc-
ument setting up a tribunal but before any trials have been
held? The sentence is unnecessary and it strikes me as prejudg-
ing what the document sets up a tribunal to judge.
In paragraph 55 it is asserted that "these suggestions draw
upon the precedents following the Second World War"?33 In-
deed? Tokyo? What happened to Judge Pal's dissent? Were the
"precedents" applied in a system of sovereign equality? To the
Soviets? Or was it a "victors'" tribunal applying "victors law" to
the vanquished? I suggest that many of the substantive laws
applied in Nuremberg and Tokyo are well-grounded in legal tra-
dition, but not the procedures and not all of the substantive
"laws."
Paragraph 75 refers to "non-member States maintaining
permanent observer missions at United Nations Headquar-
ters."34 Who are they? Only Switzerland? Or is this an invita-
tion to dispute over the status of the PLO and perhaps other
National Liberation Movements?
I have some other problems with procedures that are too
complex to be related to specific articles of the Statute or
paragraphs of the Secretary-General's Report. The basic plan is
for the national police to arrest the accused and hand him/her
over to some authority at the "seat of the International Tribu-
nal." Which authority? Dutch police? And how can the "rights
of the accused" then be "respected"? Suppose he/she tries to
subpoena the classified records of a Cabinet meeting at which it
is claimed he/she "ordered" a grave breach to be committed.
Would any country hand over such records? Would they be
trusted by any unbiased tribunal? But that is the sort of high-
31 Statute, art. 5, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 1193-94 (1993).
32 Report, para. 48, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 1173 (1993).
3 Report, para. 55, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 1174-75 (1993).
34 Report, para. 75, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 1179 (1993).
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level situation we are addressing. And how can witnesses be at
the same time confronted and their identity protected? Suppose
the Defendant's lawyer divulges the identity to news media - is
there a provision for "contempt" proceedings? Or would the de-
fendant be deprived of her/his free choice of counsel?
CONCLUSION
The basic problem that I have with the Statute of an Inter-
national Tribunal applying international criminal law to the
perpetrators of atrocities in the Balkan struggle now underway
is what seems to me to be a fundamental incompatibility be-
tween a model of the legal order under which the laws of war
are administered by an "impartial" agent of organized human-
ity, and a model under which the laws of war are administered
by each body corporate of the international legal order within
its own competence. In the former case, international tribunals
staffed by international civil servants dominate the world order.
I doubt that any great powers are willing to live within that
model. And if they were, quis custodet custodiens, who oversees
the overseers? In the latter Westphalian model, each "body cor-
porate" in the legal order chooses its own leaders and adminis-
ters its own law to whomever the legal order places within its
jurisdiction. Failures to administer the law to the satisfaction
of organized humanity result in various pressures to bring the
defaulting "body corporate" back in to the "comity of nations"
without affecting its basic authority to choose its own leaders
who must administer its own law to its own people.3 5
At this time in the evolution of world order, I strongly doubt
that any other model would be acceptable to anybody but ideal-
istic lawyers and civil servants who would seem to gain control
over the public policy of the world, but who are not responsible
for the lives and well-being of real constituencies and who are
not generally known as a group with deep moral insights.
35 See supra note 1.
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